Paul Krugman has a
nice editorial in today's New York Times regarding the nationalization of banks. Somehow terms like "nationalization" have taken on a negative meaning in today's parlance - when in reality it's partly what we are doing anyway. There is a tendency for people to get so emotionally attached to certain words and phrases that they will often have completely contradictory opinions about same concept presented using different labels. I think we're looking at situation like this.
I'm presently not a big fan of using stimulus money to "bail" out banks, because all that seems to be happening right now is that the bank's shareholders and executive management seem to be getting bailed out. It's a win for them, but a loss for taxpayers. Furthermore, I don't think anyone has a grip on exactly how much money will be needed to really repair the situation. No one knows what these banks are worth.
Normally, when you want to determine how much a business is worth, you look at the value of its assets and subtract that from the value of it's liabilities (i.e., take the difference between what the business has and what it owes). If the liabilities exceed the assets, then the business is considered insolvent.
Unfortunately, right now banks have a fair number "toxic" assets on their balance sheets. These are assets that are likely worth far less now than what the bank might have paid for them. For example, if the bank gave out a loan to someone, then it would have a fixed-income asset since the person would be expected to pay the bank some fixed amount of money, say each month, to repay the loan. If the person to whom the loan was given is no longer in a position to pay it back, then the fixed-income asset associated with the loan is worth a lot less.
Now, when you give out a loan, there's always a chance that someone won't be able to pay it back. They way you deal with that is to determine what that risk is, and alter the terms of the loan accordingly. You would look, for example, at the loan size, the income of the borrower, their credit score, how much money they have in the bank, the collateral they are putting up (e.g., if it's a mortgage, the house being bought is the collateral), and various other factors. These factors would help you determine how to structure the loan -- for example, a riskier loan might be associated with a higher interest rate.
That's a simple case, and even there the pooch was screwed since Banks did a bad job of determining the risk correctly (hence the unexpectedly large numbers of people who can't pay back their loans). Unfortunately, many of the bank's assets are more complex for several reasons. First, they often involve an amalgamation of different fixed-income assets. Second, those assets might themselves be more complex -- e.g., having their value derived from other assets. Third, and perhaps the most important, the underlying risks associated with those assets are not well understood. If I don't know anything about you, then it's hard for me to determine how risky it would be to give you a loan. (And many mortgages were given out with dubious information, forged documents, and blatantly false statements about the borrower's financial situation.)
The result is a mess.
Some of these assets might have value. After all, despite the record number of foreclosures, there are still many people out their who are able to make their monthly mortgage payments. There may be others who have hit a temporary rough patch (e.g., getting laid off), but who may be able to begin payments again. Also, if the collateral on the loan was a house, it's not like the house has zero value should it be seized by the bank in a foreclosure. It's worth something.
At the end of the day, though, trying to value these assets is complex. Without being able to value them, there's no real way to tell what the bank's financial position is. Now, would you "invest" money in a venture if you don't know what its financial position is? Probably not. If you did, you'd better get some damn good terms on that investment (much like a bank would demand higher interest rates from riskier loan applicants).
Getting back to the original message, the fact is that trying to keep these banks private and invest money in them, without having a sense of their financial picture and without getting some amazing terms on the investment, is a risky proposition. For the reasons I described above, trying to get a clear sense of the financial picture is likely not going to happen. So, all you can do is demand great terms.
However, think about that for a moment - what kinds of terms can we demand for our investment? Typical terms include increased ownership (e.g., owning a larger stake for your investment), control over decision making (so that funds are being spent in a way that you believe is appropriate rather than being spent on corporate jets and executive bonuses), and so on. Now, think about that one step further. The investor here is the government. So what we are talking about is ultimately, the Government getting a larger ownership stake in a bank and being allowed to guide the bank's operations. Yes, folks, it's nationalization.
So, when I hear some random senator (GOP or otherwise) balk at the idea of nationalization of banks, I can't help but to think that they are either stupid or that they have a hidden agenda. We can sugarcoat the language and call it something else like pre-privatization or whatever makes people feel better. But let's not kid ourselves here. I think the situation is bleak, and we need to stop beating around bush, and call it what it is so that we can deal with it.
As bleak as it is, the situation is still not hopeless. America is still a propserous country. Lots of people still have jobs and most people are still able to make their monthly payments. The toxic assets on a bank's balance sheet still have value. But I don't think we are doing ourselves any favors by allowing superficial concerns to get in the way of the rather treacherous road to recovery.
Comments, Criticisms, Flames, Words of Encouragement, etc., always Welcome!